Summary

The escalating Cold War necessitated the intensification of Western efforts against the dissemination of the Soviet ideology in the USSR’s satellite countries. Globally, significant changes in the media and cultural spheres, including the rising popularity of radio programs, meant that Cold War rivalry increasingly involved media. Propaganda became a critical weapon, a fact well understood by the newly established Information Research Department. All available channels were exploited to promote the Western way of life. This research aims to present the scope of British Cold War propaganda in Poland, focusing on the political actions of British Embassy in Warsaw and the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, and correlating them to measures undertaken by the British Council.

Keywords: zwalczanie komunizmu; stosunki polsko-brytyjskie; zimna wojna; propaganda medialna

Streszczenie

Eskalacja zimnej wojny zmusiła Zachód do zintensyfikowania wysiłków, by powstrzymać szerzenie się radzieckiej ideologii w państwach satelickich ZSRR. W tym samym czasie znaczące przemiany w mediach i kulturze, w szczególności rosnąca popularność radia, sprawiły, że rywalizacja między blokami coraz wyraźniej toczyła się na polu informacyjnym. Propaganda stała się kluczowym narzędziem; nowo utworzony Departament Badań Informacyjnych doskonale rozumiał ten fakt i wykorzystywał wszystkie dostępne kanały, by promować zachodni styl życia. Celem niniejszego opracowania jest ukazanie zakresu brytyjskiej propagandy okresu zimnej wojny w Polsce, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem aktywności politycznej Ambasady Brytyjskiej w Warszawie oraz Departamentu Północnego Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, a także jej powiązań z działalnością British Council.

Słowa kluczowe: countering the Communism; Polish-British relations; Cold War; media propaganda

Introduction

Poland’s status was determined during the Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam conferences, decisions that solidified its position on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Nevertheless, Polish-British relations experienced a brief revitalization after World War II. British diplomatic posts reopened in the rebuilding cities of Warsaw, Katowice, Łódź, Poznań, Gdańsk, and Szczecin. Mutual economic and cultural relations were also restored. However, the illusion of Poland’s potential stabilization as a self-governing state quickly faded following the rigged election to the Legislative Sejm on January 19, 1947. The tightening grip of the Cold War necessitated the intensification of Western actions against the spread of the Soviet ideology in the USSR’s satellite countries. Globally, due to major changes in the cultural sphere, such as increasing the popularity of radio programs and satellite television increased, Cold War rivalry had to incorporate the media. Everything could be a propaganda weapon. In the context of British informational activities in Poland, all possible channels were utilized to promote the Western lifestyle and counter Communism.

The aim of this research is to present the spectrum of British Cold War propaganda in Poland, focusing on the political actions of the British Embassy in Warsaw and the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, and correlating them with measures undertaken by the British Council and British media. The research hypothesis is that while Poland was subject to British propaganda policy toward USSR satellite countries, it constituted a separate entity, as the British government believed that Polish society was uniquely open to ideological change. For that reason, Poland was targeted by numerous operations of the Information Research Department, the BBC, British diplomats, and others.

The term propaganda is often interpreted inconclusively, depending on the sphere it describes. Usually, it is defined as a deliberate action aimed at shaping specific views and behaviors of an individual or a community.¹ Propaganda is often associated with materials prepared by the authorities of a given country to promote attitudes among citizens consistent with raison d’état, such as encouraging them to join the army to defend the country in wartime. In terms of politics, as Walter Lippmann pointed out:

Under the impact of propaganda, not necessarily in the sinister meaning of the word alone, the old constants of our thinking have become variables. It is no longer possible, for example, to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from the human heart. Where we act on that theory we expose ourselves to self-deception, and to forms of persuasion that we cannot verify. It has been demonstrated that we cannot rely upon intuition, conscience, or the accidents of casual opinion if we are to deal with the world beyond our reach.²

Edward Bernays, recognized as the father of Public Relations, also developed a similar elitist approach to propaganda, suggesting that the conscious manipulation of the views of the masses is an important element of a democratic society.

Both British politicians and the British media were acutely aware of the potential of internal and external propaganda in reinforcing the intellectual battlefield. Means with the most potential in shaping societal views – popular media like press, radio, and cinematography – and are of interest in this article. Tony Shaw notes that this is especially interesting as:

Artists, poets, actors, intellectuals, and philanthropies may or may not have been aware of the state’s behind-the-scenes involvement in their activities […]. But the fact that so many people and groups were prepared, unprompted, to write an essay or perform in a play that extolled democracy’s virtues or condemned the Communist way of life is one of the main reasons that official propagandists in the West in the long run held the whip hand over their Eastern competitors.³

Thus, in terms of the stated hypothesis, the points to be investigated are: Was there a special scope of British propaganda in Poland, or was it a resultant of actions undertaken toward other Soviet satellites? How efficacious were the measures undertaken by the Information Research Department (IRD)? It must be stated that the topic of British propaganda directed at Poland in the period of 1947–1948 has not yet been thoroughly researched by both Polish and British historians.⁴ This contrasts with the overview of the post-war history of Polish-British political relations, which is well-described in historiography.⁵ It should also be noted that works depicting the topic published in Poland before 1989, while potentially burdened with ideological interpretations, are factually valuable and cannot be disregarded.

1.  British political anti-communist decisions

The post-war ideological tension between the liberal West and the communist East exacerbated, particularly after the Conference of Szklaska Poręba and the subsequent proclamation of Cominform.⁶ The British concept of the “Third Force,” embodied in a fractional unit of the Foreign Office, later developed to a full-scale propagandist. However, before these initiatives materialized, Britons made political decisions that shaped their relations with Communists in Poland.⁷

The British Labour government prioritized international relations, which significantly influenced its diplomatic, financial, and social policies. Domestic affairs, however, frequently took precedence. Clement Attlee faced numerous internal problems, including country’s severe post-war economic devastation, while simultaneously navigating growing dependence on U.S. support and striving maintain Britain’s superpower status on the international stage. Cabinet-level decisions set the tone for official discussions regarding the Soviet Bloc, including Poland. The Foreign Office’s Secretary of State and the Head of the Northern Department played leading roles in formulating policy toward Warsaw. Despite its pragmatic nature, the extensive system for managing foreign relations often led to ideological disagreements. Open polemics were common regarding the legitimacy of diplomatic decisions, perceived lack of firmness in relations with Soviet Bloc governments, actions against Moscow, or excessive deference to the U.S. stance.

Beginning in early 1947, the British government began to meticulously plan its policy toward Poland. On January 14, the Foreign Office agreed to utilize BBC programs to achieve their propaganda objectives. During a subsequent meeting on January 17, a proposal was made to maintain a press correspondent in Poland, despite limited British press interest due to readers’ low engagement with Eastern European issues. British authorities had to plan their anti-Communist policy in anticipation of the upcoming elections to the Legislative Sejm. The outcome of these elections came as no surprise, as the possibility of Poland violating the Yalta provisions on free elections had been discussed in the British Parliament days prior. It was understood that the opposition in Poland would not gain power.⁸ Moreover, during this period, British Ambassador Victor Cavendish-Bentinck was recalled and declared persona non grata, accused of spying and supporting the illegal opposition.⁹ The action plan of the new Ambassador, Donald St Clair Gainer, initially aimed to counteract the expansion of Soviet ideology in Poland by promoting Western models. To this end, on January 21, 1947, British Information Centre opened in Warsaw at Marszałkowska 59/61, and the British Embassy continued to publish its licensed magazine, “Voice of England,” distributed in over 35,000 copies.¹⁰

At this time, Poland was open to global cultural cooperation and desperately needed to restore its education institutions. While the Soviets could fully provide technological assistance due to the “technological boom” in the West, this presented an opportunity for the British to subtly integrate propaganda under the guise of cultural institutions. One such institution was the British Council, which reopened in Warsaw in January 1946. That year, it donated books to 49 Polish, including various universities and the Parliamentary Library.¹¹ There was also a significant demand for English studies, with almost 400 students enrolling to English departments at Jagiellonian University in Cracow in 1947. English language departments also opened in Łódź, Poznań, Wrocław, and Warsaw.¹² The British plan was to leverage these facilities to promote Western lifestyle and ideals, and to educate Polish intellectual elite, who might seek a change in authority in the near future. The British Council’s Director, George Bidwell, reported to the Foreign Office that the institution experienced both many successes as failures in its activities. While Poles frequently visited the open library, attended cinema screenings, and exhibitions, some initiatives were stopped or banned due to “problems of political nature.”¹³

British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, met with Polish authorities Zygmunt Modzelewski and Józef Cyrankiewicz on his return from the Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Poles expressed concern about E. Bevin’s frank questioning of the legitimacy of post-war territorial grants east of the Oder-Neisse line.¹⁴ Although the tension was evident, the Polish press described the meetings as factual and conducted in a “friendly atmosphere.” The British press also positively assessed Bevin’s brief visit to Warsaw. Press comments remained moderate, as a financial agreement was imminent.¹⁵

Subsequently, chargé d’affaires Philip Broad assessed the preceding six months of British policy toward Poland and its effectiveness. He observed that British-backed socialists in Poland exerted little influence over the pro-Moscow government.¹⁶ Broad expressed concern that Polish society might perceive the London government as accepting the new political order in Poland, as E. Bevin’s meeting with J. Cyrankiewicz and Z. Modzelewski could be seen as an official legitimization of the Communist authorities. Broad recommended continuing the current policy of supporting socialists but urged the expansion of cultural, educational, and information activities through the British Council and the BBC.¹⁷

Serious debate arose concerning the funeral of Władysław Raczkiewicz, the former president of Poland in exile. While the presence of Her Majesty’s Government representatives at the funeral ceremonies in Newark seemed natural, the Communist authorities of Poland did not view it as such. A protest note was sent from Warsaw against the presence of a delegation of British Members of Parliament at the funeral,¹⁸ arguing that representatives of the British government should not openly support émigrés whose aim is to discredit the legal government in Warsaw.¹⁹

London’s propaganda measures against the communist ideology grip in the East were re-evaluated after Poland’s rejection of the Marshall Plan.²⁰ Ernest Bevin emphasized that after the Communists in Poland opted out of benefiting from overseas aid, they should not expect any loans or economic concessions with the West. Robin Hankey, the head of the Northern Department, called for immediate propaganda measures in the Soviet Union’s satellite states, demonstrating the negative effects of rejecting Marshall Plan aid.²¹

Despite the superficial continuation of trade cooperation between the two countries, this decision, and the conditions set by the United States for signatories, influenced not only Polish-British economic relations but, above all, the diplomatic sphere. The exacerbation of Cold War tensions, exemplified by the Berlin Blockade, shifted London’s focus to other international political objectives. Growing military needs and persistent tough socio-economic conditions resulted in cuts to ideological initiatives in the Soviet Union’s satellite countries. The efforts of local Foreign Office envoys from the British Embassy in Warsaw, Consulates, and cultural and educational institutions like the British Council, were often reviewed on a limited budget. Changes in relations with the West were also visible in statements from politicians and diplomats of the J. Cyrankiewicz government. In August, Polish ambassador to the United States Józef Winiewicz, presented relations with Great Britain as an example of symbiotic cooperation in a conversation with Secretary of State George Marshall, while in September, Z. Modzelewski emphasized the exemplary relationship with France.²²

On November 25, the Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in London, addressing the problems of countries within the Soviet sphere of influence. A significant “cooling” in relations with the East was evident. During one of the speeches, Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov attacked the “world of imperialism,” which ended the deliberations and confirmed the West’s conviction that there were too many divergences between Eastern and Western. At the December Cabinet meeting, E. Bevin stated that it was impossible to reach a consensus with the government in Moscow, and thus it would also be difficult to gain influence on the situation in Poland.²³

A significant event in international British politics was the opening of IRD. As mentioned, the idea of establishing a unit to promote Western ideology and counteract the expansion of Communism emerged as early as 1946. To this end, E. Bevin commissioned work on “propaganda of the third force.” Guidelines were prepared by Parliamentary Undersecretary of State Christopher Mayhew and former chairman of the Soviet FO Commission Christopher Warner. Mayhew was one of the few politicians who, since the end of the war, were suspicious of the communist ideas. He predicted that Britain would soon face an ideological duel with the Soviet Union and its influence on Europe. In his views, Britain’s main goal was to disseminate the so-called “demoluded” propaganda, featuring elements of a reformist, progressive, and anti-communist nature. Some of these concepts were adopted by the emerging IRD.²⁴

The official mission of the Department, as presented by E. Bevin in a top-secret Cabinet Memorandum, was to collect information on Communist policy, tactics, and propaganda, and provide materials for anti-Communist publicity.²⁵ The latter was to be disseminated through Information Services abroad in cooperation with the BBC. Bevin prompted the idea of empowering European socialists and peasants form Communist countries with knowledge on the Western lifestyle and resources for their struggle within their own nations. He sought “to make London the Mecca for Social Democrats in Europe.”²⁶ Initially, the department’s operating methods mirrored those used during the war, involving printing and distributing propaganda leaflets and pamphlets in target countries. However, they proved ineffective, leading to a decision to intensify open activities in the press. The department would focus on: 1) immediately challenging the allegations of the Soviet Union against the capitalist world; 2) preparing speeches for British diplomats, enabling them to effectively counter any potential attacks by the USSR; 3) preparing newspaper articles with attached testimonies of witnesses, statistics, or other authenticated information (such comments were to appear in the press immediately after any Communist attacks); 4) disseminating “sibs” and spreading false, typically negative, rumors among citizens of a given country, leveraging the psychological tendency for people to share unpleasant or controversial facts and events.²⁷ As early as after two months after its opening, the IRD began preparing reports on the situation in Poland. A comprehensive note was created, describing the distressing activities of the Communists, who were taking control over all spheres of life in the country. The social discontent in Poland was of particular interest, as the key element of IRD’s publicity was “equating the Communism with Nazism.”²⁸

The cooling of mutual relations was evident also in economic policy. On April 16, 1948, all countries receiving aid under the Marshall Plan signed the European Economic Cooperation Convention, the aimed to broaden the scope of their relations. With the United Kingdom’s accession to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the number of trade contacts with Poland decreased.²⁹

At the end of 1948, the exacerbation of the Cold War was apparent in most spheres of social life in Poland. The actions of British diplomatic posts were constrained. The most effective channel for permeating Western values was through media and activities of the IRD.

2.  Countering communism and the media

British policy for counteracting Communist ideology in relation to all Soviet Bloc countries, centered on: 1) aid measures for economic development, the “side effect” of which was the signing of lucrative trade agreements for essential raw materials for the British; 2) expansion of cultural activities through the activities through the British Council and libraries offering English-language press; 3) producing leaflets with pro-liberal slogans and organizing exhibitions and cinema screenings promoting the “Western” lifestyle; 4) influencing the press by sending ideologically marked articles prepared by the British, supporting pro-freedom movements, 5) the activities of radio stations. In addition to regular activities within the these domains, Britain undertook a great number of political and diplomatic initiatives aimed at counteracting Communism. The press played a significant role in shaping the perception of cultural relations, both from Polish and British newspapers, which sought to leverage their position in the political arena. Although they could be perceived as carriers of news, their content would often represent interests of wealthy boards. Press articles were also the result of the propaganda activities of relevant services, and in the case of the British, also of the IRD. British media, firmly entangled in the propaganda campaign, were also subtly controlled, due to the post-war reinforcement of pro-capitalist discourse.³⁰ John Jenks states that: “This legacy of total war and the exigencies of Cold War – particularly propaganda – kept the British media tightly self-disciplined when it came to the Soviet Union and Communism.”³¹ To the British, propaganda also appeared to be the most effective weapon in countering Communism and maintaining Britain’s global leading status, because it involved less expenses than other measures.³²

Investigative reporter David Leigh described the IRD as a “media management instrument” that “poisoned the wells of journalism.”³³ The British published articles describing the reality behind the Iron Curtain, but some of them aimed to evoke a feeling of injustice and compassion in the reader, while simultaneously justifying London’s actions toward Poland and other pro-Soviet states. Regarding Poland, the premise presented in the British press was clear: the gradual deterioration of Poles’s living conditions, caused by the strengthening cooperation with the Soviet Union and the communization of social life, should be stopped. It is difficult to determine the extent to which these premises corresponded to the implementation of political and economic assumptions. The latter was clearly identified by the IRD, which instructed the media to focus mainly on topics proposed in the form of long lists. Among them were: 1) presenting the accounts of former communists who condemned socialist ideas, 2) showing the losses experienced by the Soviet Union’s satellite countries due to the rejection of the Marshall Plan, and 3) publishing reports from force labor camps and prisons of a political nature.³⁴ One of the minutes sent to the IRD confirms that such techniques were frequently employed. Jonathan Griffin sent a record of his discussion on Poland with French musician Henri Barraud, after his three-week visit to the country. Barraud visited major Polish cities and met several tourists, including Americans, who encountered no problems traveling freely. He was amazed by the “extraordinary speed and scale of the reconstruction” and noted that an average worker in Poland could afford more food than a French one. However, he did mention problems in Poland’s clothing industry, stating that “clothes and shoes are terribly expensive,” and commented on the inequality in salaries between high officials and workers, asserting that “economic inequality being far greater in Poland than in France.” This section is highlighted in the documents and annexed with a brief stating that the negative fragment should be used in the media, but the Northern Department needs to find a source to cite it in the press.³⁵

To some extent, British authorities realized that effective counteraction in propaganda could be achieved by building social resistance. For this purpose, content was selected to show the true nature of communist policy in various spheres of life. This was important because the communist media operated on the principle of a “megaphone syndrome” – the authorities’ propaganda outlet, the press and the radio were integral to the political struggle. The constant defamation of the British authorities, diplomats, and Western ideas was intended to curb Poles’ interest in living on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Such a policy, however, backfired.

Western radio stations were gradually gained popularity. Since part of the BBC broadcasts was consulted with the IRD, media became the executor of government assumptions. One of the researchers of the IRD, H. Wilford, called the BBC ‘”he most important non-FO channel for the dissemination of IRD output overseas.”³⁶ However, financial considerations posed a significant limitation. Due to the difficult budget situation in 1947, shortening the duration of Polish BBC broadcasts was even considered, but ultimately did not occur. The main opponent of such a solution was British Ambassador D. Gainer, who understood that the BBC was the main tool for conveying British propaganda in the East and that it influenced Poles with great effectiveness. It is true that the direction of radio propaganda was not always supported by British diplomats in Poland. Gainer tried to convince the management of the Northern Department to take steps to soften the content of the broadcast, for example, in the case of the programs of Głos Wolnej Polski by Adam Ciołkosz and Jan Nowak. The BBC’s program was much softer, yet the communist authorities tried to interfere with all Western broadcasts, including the British ones.³⁷ Compared to the programs offered by other radio stations, the BBC commented on the reality in a moderate manner. This was in line with Britain’s overall policy of launching propaganda attacks, but not indiscriminately.³⁸

After S. Mikołajczyk’s escape to London, the British press widely publicize the fate of his associates who remained in Poland.³⁹ It was argued that they were being interrogated and falsely accused of collaborating in his escape. This problem was also widely commented on by British politicians, who expressed concern about the Polish government’s actions that led to the situation. The Polish press did not publicize Mikołajczyk’s escape extensively, a typical Communist action to suppress such incidents. Yet another “glitch” on the Warsaw-London line was the show trial of Maria Marynowska, an employee of the Information Section of the British Embassy in Warsaw. It coincided with the Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers, during which V. Molotov attacked Western states, accusing them of imperialism. As Włodzimierz Borodziej claims, this criticism did not go unnoticed in Poland and thus could have impacted on the course of the trial and its outcome.⁴⁰ Marynowska was accused of being a WiN activist and of translating and passing memoranda to the United Nations and the then British Ambassador V. Cavendish-Bentinck; the second charge was distributing resistance movement press in the American and British embassies.⁴¹ She was sentenced to twelve years in prison and deprived of public rights for five years. The Polish side used the trial to depreciate the image of Western diplomats. The negative tone of cooperation and support for anti-communist actions by the C. Attlee government was emphasized, even though London’s policy toward the Polish underground was different. Additionally, the WiN organization was presented as a group of traitors collaborating with imperialist powers. Following the announcement of the verdict, Ambassador D. Gainer openly stated that the trial had only a political dimension and that no judge in the United Kingdom would even consider the process, let alone conduct it. He argued that due to Poland’s ideological dependence on the Soviet Union, the verdict could not be different. At the same time, he emphasized that if the legitimacy of the law in Poland were recognized, the British embassy as part of the process, would also be to blame.⁴² While upholding the principle that the British would not comment on political arrests, the trial, despite the constant lack of comments from British politicians, became extremely media-driven. Polish-British relations were said to have “hit rock bottom.” Western press focused on the political dimension of the process and the unlawful sentence. However, the Polish press used it as an example of aggressive Western influence-seeking methods.⁴³

Media also played a significant role in shaping the political atmosphere surrounded the Summer Olympics, held in London from July 29 to August 14, 1948. The Games, resuming after a twelve-year hiatus, featured athletes from fifty-nine countries, notably excluding the Soviet Union, which decline to participate. The Kraków daily “Dziennik Polski” published an article describing the opening of the Games, highlighting in bold “the first scratch” – a British publishing house’s map of participating countries that includes Poland’s 1939 borders.⁴⁴ According to the article’s author, this was a deliberate measure intended to diminish Poland’s post-World War II standing. Despite the unpleasant political atmosphere, contacts between Polish sportsmen and capitalist states positively influenced the authorities in Warsaw and affirmed the position of Polish sport globally.⁴⁵

In the fall, another political arrest gained media attention. Charles Whitehead, the technical director of the Wedel sweets factory and an employee of the Advertising Section of the British Embassy in Warsaw, was accused of collaborating with the Third Reich during World War II.⁴⁶ Initially, the British Embassy opted for a different strategy than that employed during M. Marynowska’s arrest, choosing to publicize the case. British diplomats in Warsaw eagerly commented on the political dimension of the detention. The director of the Northern Department, R. Hankey, instructed the Embassy’s personnel to emphasize the absurd nature of Ch. Whitehead’s arrest in public statements. However, this tactic soon proved ineffective and risked provoking the prosecutor. The ultimate lack of media interest in the trial contributed to a relatively light sentence, with Whitehead being sentenced to four years in prison.⁴⁷

In 1948, discussions also occurred regarding the possibility of relocating the “Voice of England” office from Kraków to Warsaw, citing closer cooperation of journalists with the British Embassy’s Information Department, easier data flow, and a more secure method of transmitting confidential information. An atmosphere of suspicion toward Western journalists and diplomats was apparent. All overt activities of British posts in Poland faced significant restrictions.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, this period presented an opportunity for the IRD to pursue its core objectives: to inform the Polish audience about the disparity in social living standards and political freedom, and empower them to pursue their own, non-Soviet driven politics, a development that would not fully materialize in Poland until 1956.

Conclusion

Numerous propaganda methods were employed by the British authorities to promote the Western way of life. For Poles, British diplomatic posts, such as British Consulates or Embassy in Warsaw, served as centers of knowledge about events behind the Iron Curtain, which consequently led to restrictions on their activities by the Communists. For this reason, the British Council and numerous English language departments in Polish universities assumed the role of propagating the Western way of life. They also disseminated propaganda materials under the guise of educational context, although, their actions were also impeded starting in 1948.

The tightening grip of the Cold War eventually led to an almost impenetrable blockade of most official British pro-Western initiatives in Poland. The gradual isolation of diplomats and citizens working in Western institutions made it increasingly difficult for the British to operate. No later than four years after its reopening in Poland, the British Council had to cease direct sales of English-language books and periodicals. The Warsaw government took control of all such activities, introducing restrictions on the sale of non-Russian publications. Due to numerous problems and failures, the planning of concerts and theater events with the participation of British artists was also discontinued. Still, covert measures to achieve the Foreign Office’s goals were continued by global media. The BBC, softly steered by the IRD, proved most successful in reaching Polish homes. The Department aimed to gather information on difficulties within Polish society, such as food-shortages, unavailability of basic products, wage inequality, and the employments of women and youth work in heavy industry, and subsequently use this information to highlight the gap between Western and Eastern socialist models.

All things considered, Poland remained of interest to C. Attlee’s government, especially as it provided Britain with essential goods such as meat or timber. His Majesty’s Government (HMG) needed to find a way to counter Communism and undermine the monolithic spread of soviet ideology in Poland, but in a manner that would not jeopardize mutual economic relations. Thus, due to aforementioned factors, a need for implicit impact emerged and was embodied in cultural and education initiatives, supported by the IRD, the BBC, and the local press. Local diplomats, teachers, lecturers, librarians, trade unionists, and other Britons working in Poland played a key role as both gatherers of knowledge about conditions behind the Iron Curatin and circulators of propaganda among Poles. It is difficult to evaluate their precise success, though considering that the Polish society sought contact with Western facilities, eagerly listened to the BBC, and pursued British press, the likelyhood of British propaganda reaching Polish homes was high.

References/Bibliografia

Archival Sources

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