

Reconstruction of the economy of the southern regions of the Ukrainian SSR and socio-economic revival of Crimea after the Second World War

Odbudowa gospodarki południowych regionów Ukraińskiej SRR i ożywienie społeczno-gospodarcze Krymu po II wojnie światowej

Streszczenie:

Artykuł traktuje o statusie społeczno-ekonomicznym półwyspu krymskiego oraz sąsiadujących z nim regionów Ukraińskiej SRR po zakończeniu II wojny światowej. Na podstawie danych o stanie gospodarki i zasobów pracy na Krymie, po zakończeniu działań wojennych i deportacji ludności tubylczej na jego terytorium, a także sytuacji społeczno-gospodarczej obwodu chersońskiego i wschodnich regionów Ukraińskiej SRR, analizie poddano podstawowe wyznaczniki ożywienia gospodarczego obwodu krymskiego. Rozważania oparte zostały na zachowanych archiwaliach, w tym korespondencji gospodarczej i statystykach władz Ukraińskiej SRR oraz partii rządzącej (PK(b)U). Ustalono, że w południowo-wschodnich regionach Ukraińskiej SRR uruchomione zostały duże zasoby pracy i materiałów, mające służyć realizacji ważnych projektów w dziedzinie przemysłu i rolnictwa. Przede wszystkim zwrócono uwagę na rozwój energetyki w oparciu o przemysł węglowy Donbasu i energię ciepłą Ukrainy Naddnieprzańskiej. Stworzyło to podwaliny pod rozwój systemu nawadniania suchych ziem południowych regionów Ukrainy i elektryfikację rolnictwa. Jednocześnie realizacja wielkich projektów rozwojowych obszarów przylegających do półwyspu krymskiego podczas pierwszego po zakończeniu II wojny światowej planu pięcioletniego stworzyło dobrą podstawę dla rozwoju gospodarczego tych ziem.

Słowa kluczowe:

Ukraińska Socjalistyczna Republika Radziecka, Krym, elektryfikacja rolnictwa, rolnictwo południowych regionów Ukrainy i Krymu

Summary:

The research has provided an analysis of the social and economic situation on the Crimean Peninsula after the end of the World War Second, as well as on the territory of Ukrainian SSR neighboring to it. The obtained data as regards the situation with the economy and manpower resources of Crimea after the end of military operations and expulsion of indigenous peoples on its territory, as well as the social and economic situation of Kherson region and east regions of Ukraine provided the basis on which the main conditions of economic recreation of the Crimean region were studied. The materials were analyzed based on archive funds including business correspondence and statistical data of the state authorities in Ukrainian SSR and in the governing party (Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks) the bodies of which actually took all principal management decisions. The research showed that significant manpower and material resources were activated in southeast regions of Ukraine with the purpose of implementing large-scale projects in the industry and agriculture. The biggest attention was paid to development of power generation based on coal mining in Donets Basin and heat power generation in Dnipro Basin. Formation of powerful energy areas created conditions for development of systems for irrigating arid land in south regions of Ukraine, electrification of agriculture and formation of powerful industrial clusters in those regions of Ukraine that were neighboring to the Crimean Peninsula. Realization of large-scale projects of development in the regions, which were neighboring to territory of Crimea during the years of the first five-year plan implementation after the end of the World War Second created conditions for the economic recreation of Crimea through applying the experience and extending the territory scope of projects implementation to the territory of peninsula.

Keywords:

Ukrainian SSR, Crimea, agriculture electrification, agriculture of southern regions of Ukraine and Crimea

1. Political and socio-economic prerequisites for the implementation of programs to restore the economic potential of the southern regions of the Ukrainian SSR

Political issues around the status of Crimea over the course of last few years have actualized historic studies of peninsula's socio-economical development, mainly of the period when military action on its territory in the end of the Second World War was finished and territory was annexed to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. Military action at times of war on this territory destroyed industrial complexes and economic relations on regional as well as on national levels. Crimean region was considered to be a part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and Russian regions adjacent to Crimea up to 1954. Actually, Crimean peninsula at times of war was surrounded with regions with destroyed infrastructure. The peninsula itself suffered due to the military action on its territory as well as from Stalin's policy of native peoples deportation (Crimean tatars, Bulgarians, Greeks). That's why reconstruction of Crimean economy as well as boosting its socio-economic growth depended on the development of adjacent regions.

Socioeconomic development of the Crimean Peninsula and adjacent Ukrainian regions after the end of World War II was generally discussed in the works of Soviet period's scholars¹. Certain attention to that set of problems was also paid in the works of Ukrainian researchers after 1991² and by Russian scientists.

The specificity of the status of researching the problems of socioeconomic development of the southern Ukrainian regions and the Crimean Peninsula is that the Soviet researchers viewed it in ideological context. Same as in the case with Soviet period's socioeconomic development directives, prescriptive approach to describing the USSR history prevailed. Therefore, in the context of directives, historians described the development of Ukraine and the Crimea in the period of the 1946-1950 Five-Year Socioeconomic Development Plan implementation primarily basing on legal and regulatory documents that provided only general data regarding the plans and their outcomes based on reports. Any use of archival funds was also restricted for ideological reasons in the Soviet period, and hence, the Soviet researchers could only study the set

¹ В. Юрчук, И. Кожукало, Коммунистическая партия во главе всенародной борьбы за восстановление и развитие народного хозяйства Советской Украины (1946-1950 гг.), Київ 1986.

² В. Баран, В. Даниленко, Україна в умовах системної кризи (1946-1980-ті рр.), Київ 1999.

of problems within prescribed limits. Foreign researchers could not use any documents from Soviet archives, and therefore, they could only describe the Soviet policy after World War II in their works in general terms. The Crimean Peninsula at the time of breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 integrated into Ukraine's administrative and economic system quite closely. For that reason, the area of system research into the problem of the Crimea's socioeconomic integration with Ukraine was of no interest to Ukrainian researchers. Their works were mostly dedicated to political matters of the peninsula's history and ethnosocial processes in the Crimea. Only the Crimean historians took interest in studying the peninsula's socioeconomic development after World War II³.

However, analysis of a solid array of sources should be made for comprehensive research into this set of problems. The specificity of the Soviet system of administering the socioeconomic processes in the period after the end of World War II lied in its prescriptive nature. Development of the USSR generally was based on plans, that is, the development plans for each five years, the so-called "five-year plans", were adopted. In particular, the 1946-1950 Development Plan was adopted in 1946. That plan set the main areas of investments in economic development and determined the priority sectors and their build up regions. According to that socioeconomic development plan and based on resolutions of the union-level government (the USSR Council of Ministers), main construction projects and priority sector development programs were financed. In its turn, such financing was distributed pursuant to the USSR State Budget that set the amounts of financing of both the Soviet Union republics and economy sectors and social sphere. Implementation of large-scale programs and projects of plant construction was based on resolutions of the highest executive body if USSR-scale projects were concerned. Projects and programs at the level of constituent republics were implemented pursuant to resolutions of governments of such republics. In the case with economic development of the UkrSSR's southern areas that were adjacent to the Crimea, the appropriate resolutions of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers were issued, and with the Crimea, those of the Russian SFSR Council of Ministers. Based on detailed guidelines under such resolutions, ministries and other organizations, vested with project and program implementation responsibilities according to the government resolutions, were to ensure work organization and performance. Hence, the sources for studying the process of economic development of Ukraine's southern regions are divided into two groups: officially published

³ В. Пащенко, Крымская область в советский период (1946-1991 гг.): Монография, Симферополь 2008.

laws and regulations and working correspondence between government agencies, organizations of the ruling party, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (VCP(b) in Russian) (Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine in the UkrSSR) and economic organizations, and local governments. The laws and regulations issued by the government set a general algorithm of action to implement large-scale economic programs and construction projects. Those documents also set project implementation responsibilities of ministries, local governments, and other organizations. However, those laws and regulations were only general directives, often adopted without sufficient regard to source data. Often, central bodies of the government and the party ruling in the USSR adopted their guidelines and sent them to ministries and organizations for implementation without full account of local specificity. That often resulted in unforeseen obstructions arising when such directives were implemented. Regular were occasions when capabilities to mobilize human resource for implementing any of the projects or physical resources were calculated incorrectly at the government level. Also adopted were decisions to redirect resources envisaged for any of the project to other programs of higher priority. Due to such directive implementation specificity, needs for adjusting the large-scale project implementation algorithm constantly arose when such projects were implemented. For that reason, informal relations between government officials and ruling party men played an important role in the Soviet command and administrative system of economy management which had an especially high level of management centralization after the end of World War II. Therefore, the project implementation algorithms laid down in the laws and regulation may be analyzed as general ones. Only documents that reflect the relations between central and local executive authorities, ruling party bodies, and economic organizations can reveal the actual process of large-scale program implementation. Such documents are most concentrated in the Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine. That refers to Fund No. 1 (of the Communist Party of Ukraine's Central Committee) in which incoming and outgoing documents of the highest authority of the party ruling in Ukraine in the period after the end of World War II is concentrated. At the time when the programs envisaged in the 1946-1950 Five-Year Socioeconomic Development Plan were implemented, the sole ruling party in the USSR was vested primarily with the functions to supervise the socioeconomic development programs. However, the All-Union CP(b) (VCP(b)) (CP(b)U in the UkrSSR) actually took over the functions of providing large economic and social project implementa-

tion conditions. The mobilization of labor resources for implementing the socio-economic programs at the republic-wide level (in this instance, the UkrSSR and Russian SFSR) and developing a system to manage such resources became its main function. An extensive network of local organizations enabled the ruling party to mobilize labor resources. Moreover, the party organizations were established not only regionally but also within teams of workers, at public and industrial organizations, etc. As provided in the VCP(b) Charter, each ruling party member was required to comply with any party's instructions while holding any post. Therefore, only the ruling party could record for labor resources most accurately and possessed the most effective mechanisms of their mobilization, because that primarily applied to the party members who were required to mobilize themselves at a word of the party authorities. Accordingly, no project could be implemented without using the ruling party's mobilization resource. In addition, owing to the coverage of all public and economic entities in the UkrSSR and Russian SFSR, including regionally, the ruling party could control activities of all its members holding different administrative posts. Therefore, for program implementation, the ruling party also mobilized physical resources and used organizations and entities, who enabled to implement the algorithm of action for implementing the large-scale socioeconomic development programs. Actually, the practice of adopting large-scale project implementation resolutions by the ruling party's central governing body and the highest executive authority acting jointly prevailed in the Soviet period, and especially, in the years when the five-year socioeconomic development plans were implemented. At the Soviet Union level, such resolutions were adopted jointly by the VCP(b) Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, and at the UkrSSR level, by the UkrSSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of CP(b)U. In that way, the legal framework of joint responsibility on the part of the ruling party and executive authorities for implementing the socioeconomic development programs was ensured. Accordingly, the socioeconomic development program implementation algorithm was adjusted owing to and through the mediation of the party organizations. That is why the largest number of documents that describe the algorithms of actions to implement construction projects and economy sector, etc. development programs and their implementation and outcomes, are contained in the ruling party's archival funds. The ruling party's governing body in Ukraine, the CP(b)U, maintained working correspondence with the communist party's central governing body, the VCP(b) Central Committee, and with the USSR central exec-

utive authority, the USSR Council of Ministers. Of special interest is the working correspondence of the CC CP(b)U with regional party organizations and those within economic entities. In fact, such correspondence fully uncovers immediate information about the progress of planned large-scale project implementation, measures to provide the required conditions, and unblocking process. The party's archival fund documents include the provisions of economy sector development programs at the level of the entire Soviet Union, in particular, regarding agricultural, power sector, transportation system, etc. development. The funds of the Central State Archive of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine enable to analyze the procedures for resolving specific problem management situations at both regional and general UkrSSR levels. Documents of the central executive authority, the UkrSSR Council of Ministers, and ministries and correspondence with regional executive bodies and economic organizations are concentrated in that archive.

The documents in the Ukrainian archives enable to assess labor resource condition in both the UkrSSR southern areas and the Crimea as well as throughout Ukraine in the years of the five-year republic's socioeconomic development plan implementation. In addition, we can assess capabilities of the Ukraine's ruling party to mobilize labor resources and use such capabilities for implementing large-scale construction projects and current measures to ensure control over mobilized workers' activities.

The Kherson region State Archive should be specifically noted among the regional archival funds of the party ruling in the period of implementing the provisions of the 1946-1950 Five-Year USSR Socioeconomic Development Plan. Additionally, the funds of regional authorities and economic organizations, who implemented the programs of developing the region's economy sectors, are of interest in that archive. The said Ukrainian region is immediately adjacent to the Crimean Peninsula's territory. For that reason, numerous projects, which also covered the regions adjacent to Kherson region, including the Crimea, were implemented on its territory. Accordingly, preconditions for the Crimean Peninsula's socioeconomic development were created on that region's territory. Noteworthy, in particular, are the programs of constructing the motorway Moscow-Simferopol, which was to ensure the transport link between the Crimean Peninsula and the mainland, and developing the rail link between the Crimea and Ukraine. Low population density and poor labor resource quality was the main problem of the southern Ukrainian areas and the Crimea. Therefore, the socioeconomic development programs, implemented in

Kherson region, were focused on creating the preconditions for populating that region. The Kherson Oblast State Archive's materials describe the implementation of the region's steppe area agricultural development, irrigation system construction, and agricultural electrification programs. Such projects laid the foundation for populating the region that experienced demographic problems and transferring its economic development experience to southern areas of the Crimea that were similar as to their climatic parameters.

The purpose of article is to investigate and characterize economic development of the Ukrainian SSR regions adjacent to the territory of Crimean peninsula in first years after the Second World War as well as to uncover factors preceding the socio-economic development of Crimea.

In the USSR after the Second World War reconstruction of economy was approached with command-administrative planning what emphasized the creation of special territorial production hubs or complexes. In the end of Stalin's career as a politician the key feature of economic reconstruction in the USSR was a shift from the military one to the pattern of peacetime economy. Economy ought to be competitive in the world scale following the key criteria and representing economic potential competitive to the USA's. That fact was emphasized by Soviet Union politicians on a regular basis. And their limited in time government was to create a competitive economy despite the political turmoil and Cold War. Since 1947 we can see the shift from economical to political battle with West. So, key economic indicators had to grow in a small period with the use of as little resources as possible.

Productive force location in the USSR after the Second World War was quite advantageous. Disproportion in work force concentration between eastern USSR regions and European part of the country. It was meant to be a tough reconstruction with a lack of labour, material resources as well as production capacity, especially on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR as a result of industrial complexes evacuation during the Second World War in the European part of the country. Industrial complexes were either destroyed or evacuated to the eastern parts at times of war. This cumulative factor preceded the rehabilitation process of the Ukrainian SSR economy to be peculiar. Socio-economic development of the Soviet Union after the Second World War was carried out with «five-year plans». The Ukrainian SSR government was actively exploiting the local republican resources to minimize the usage of ones from the other republics during the «5-year-plans», especially, at times of war (1946-1958). The traditional command-administrative type of economic direction with material

resources and labour distributed vertically at the the level of ministries was followed at the same time. Only the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks head structure in the USSR and Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks could minimize difficulties of the administrative origin and rapidly mobilize material resources and labour.

According to the demographic data in possession of the CC CP(b)U, the UkrSSR territory, in spite of demographic consequences of the war and occupation, featured relatively sizable human and physical resources. In particular, as of April 1, 1944, the UkrSSR population totaled 21,990.7 thousand persons (without Zakarpattia [Trans Carpathian] region and the Crimea that were not parts of Ukraine at that time, and the part of Lviv region where military actions still continued); the population data as at July 1, 1941, whereby the population amounted to 48,657.1 thousand persons, should be quoted for comparison⁴. Out of the total population, 1,689.5 thousand persons lived in region centers (4,598.5 thousand persons as of July 1, 1941)⁵. As soon as at April 1, 1946, the population of only region`s that were parts of the USSR by 1939, was 25,277 thousand persons, and totally (including Zakarpattia region), 33,217 thousand persons⁶. That is, absolute minority of the total population lived in big cities. In should be noted that such data, obviously, was obtained analytically with no full observance of the population census and registration methods. However, the party authorities assessed the population to plan the buildup of the ruling party, Komsomol [Young Communist League], and other organizations` bodies. Attention should also be paid to the fact that human resources predominantly concentrated at collective farms, and therefore, they were a human resource reserve very suitable for mobilization. In particular, almost half of human resources at collective farms were not involved in production processes as at 1947; however, they were actively used for working in the industry and transport sectors that experienced shortage of workforce in postwar years⁷. The lack of labor resources was especially observed at construction sites as was stressed by the Kherson Oblast CP(b)U. That, in particular, referred to the oil

⁴ Колличество населения по областям (УРСР на 1946 р. – П. С.), Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України (далі – ЦДАГО України), ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 3967, арк. 4.

⁵ Население в областных центрах (на 1946 р. – П. С.), ЦДАГО України., ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 3970, арк. 5.

⁶ Численность населения по областям УССР (на 1946 р. – П. С.), ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 3970, арк. 1-2.

⁷ Справка о наличии трудоспособных в колхозах УССР и количестве колхозников, которые могут быть использованы на период 1-го квартала 1947 г. в промышленности, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4051, арк. 138.

refining plant rehabilitation in Kherson⁸ and when the matter of constructing houses for collective farmers was discussed.

However, notable is the availability of powerful human resource mobilization tools in Ukraine. The presence of quite extensive communist party network and quite a large number of the ruling party and Komsomol members should be highlighted as the major mobilization tools. In particular, 936,814 persons were Komsomol members in the UkrSSR as of July 1, 1946⁹, and party members numbered 60,218 persons, united into 5,452 primary party organizations as of April 1¹⁰. Owing to the party and Komsomol entities, labor resources were used for implementation of large-scale projects that required involvement of huge human resources. It was that factor by which the promotion “from the top” of a more active process of admitting new members to the ruling party was driven. In particular, already 452,477 persons, united into 5,522 primary organizations, were party members as at July 1, 1946¹¹, while there were 416,343 party members as of May 1, 1946¹². The data regarding the size and growth rate of the party organizations and ruling party members on the UkrSSR territory in the postwar period are important in the context of reviewing the problem given the need for large-scale labor resource mobilization for implementing the economic projects that later enabled to extend them from the territory of the Ukraine’s southern areas to Crimean region. The way, in which the mobilization capabilities of the party and government authorities with respect to human resources enabled to take the initiative in ensuring the operating management of large-scale project implementation in not only the UkrSSR but those extending beyond it, in particular, ensuring the economy development in the Crimea, will be demonstrated below.

The integral component of political reconstruction in the Ukrainian SSR was ideology, too. Soviet Union politics meant the maximum possible industrial development with equity and the increasing number of proletarians, so-called employees being alienated from the ownership on means of production. Workers of collective farms and state farms in the village were in the same conditions with industrial workers. This ought to become a solid base of soviet re-

⁸ Секретарю ЦК КП(б)У товарищу Хрущеву Н. С. Докладная записка по письму секретаря Херсонского обкома КП(б)У тов. Федорова (від – П. С.) Зам. Секретаря ЦК КП(б)У по нефтяной промышленности Т. Гонты. 11.VI.1948 г., ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 5132, арк. 7.

⁹ О составе комсомольских организаций по областям УССР на 1.VII.46, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 3970, арк. 18.

¹⁰ КП(б)У (довідник – П. С.), ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 3967, арк. 6.

¹¹ О количественном составе КП(б)У (на 1946 р.– П. С.), ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 3970, арк. 3.

¹² Численный состав КП(б)У на 1-е мая 1946 года, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 3970, арк. 5.

gime in the USSR. And immediate economic breakthrough of the USSR border regions was necessary to provide territory with specific environment boosting its occupancy rate, enhancing allocation of significant military personnel as well as accelerating trade relations to extend the economic influence on European countries adjacent to the USSR border regions. The Ukrainian SSR experienced truly difficult socio-political situation. Government was to provide secure and equal economic regional development to take control over the situation. Not only the western Ukrainian SSR regions but also southern regions of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic including Crimea were facing difficulties at that time. And reason for that was the USA's containment policy against Greece and Turkey.

This policy was a concern to be manifested in statements during the sessions of Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in the Ukrainian SSR was making mainly diplomatic arrangements to confront the policy of the USA in Turkey. A request was sent to the Moscow Library named after Lenin, Committee to get the informational report concerning the agreement between Ukrainian SSR and Turkey in 1922. The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created in 1945. This is a notable fact, because since that republic could commit the foreign policy as a subject of international relations.

2. The situation of the economy and social sphere of the Crimea during the implementation of the economic development plan of the USSR in the first five years after the Second World War

Development of the USSR economy after the end of World War II and utilization of regional capabilities were based on the service network establishment principle. Both logistical systems, which were established around junction points, and energy systems, established by construction of power transmission lines, became such service networks. Development and electrification of agriculture determined the economic feasibility of such service networks. For constructing such service networks, the ruling party carried out a large-scale mobilization of human resources who were always on standby for their engagement in most diverse projects. Collective farmers (peasants who stayed at collective farms) formed a special kind of such resources. They were involved in construction projects and work in industry without difficulty. The ruling party and USSR governments mobilization capabilities were such that workers

could be promptly and efficiently used in open spaces and landscapes. It was such landscape that formed on territory of the UkrSSR despite the fact that it extremely suffered due to the military actions in the years of World War II. Moreover, all preconditions for establishing the service networks were ready in that landscape. There was a system of rivers that enabled to build up railway and road transport in combination with river transport. The system of hydroelectric stations in the Dnieper, the river performing the central strategic function in the Ukrainian river system, became the backbone for establishing the service system, the Southern Energy Area. However, the mobilization potential of the ruling party and executive authorities in the USSR was less efficient in closed landscapes as was the Crimean Peninsula. The peninsula's resource potential was limited and gave no way for building up a service system on its territory. Therefore, development of the logistical service system to the Crimea and its inclusion in the energy service system resulted in feasibility of labor and physical resource mobilization to implement the peninsula's socioeconomic development programs.

The ruling party's governing body in the UkrSSR, the CC CP(b)U received the statistical data regarding the status of the Crimea's agricultural development in 1954. Those data were adopted for planning the peninsula's socioeconomic development; such planning was already the responsibility of the Ukrainian government once the Crimea was transferred from the Russian SFSR to the UkrSSR. Those statistical data, on a moving basis since 1950 and by year, disclosed the condition of agricultural enterprises (collective farms) in such terms as population (of working and unemployable age), debts of collective farms, land plot areas, output of products, etc. Those data enable to analyze the condition of agriculture in the Crimea and main trends in that sector on both the peninsula in general and in its separate districts. According to those data, the condition of the Crimea's main sector was very poor, and some positive changes occurring in separate areas of the peninsula could not be deemed a general trend. The main problem in the Crimean agriculture was demographic, a disastrous scarcity of employable population and a large number of unemployable age population. It should also be noted that production processes mostly were not mechanized in that period. In addition, on the background of well-proven in the USSR methods of labor resource mobilization for implementing labor-intensive socioeconomic development programs and large-scale construction projects, there was no possibility to recruit a sufficient low-cost workforce for implementing such projects in the Crimea in the period after World War II.

Hence, any positive changes in the Crimean Peninsula's economy could only be possible if preconditions for increasing employable population were created. Resettlement of population to territories that were promising for economic development was often practiced in the USSR. Population from the Russian SFSR was relocated to the Crimean peninsula's territory in the period of the 1946-1950 Five-Year Socioeconomic Development Plan implementation. However, many of those relocated persons left the peninsula. The resettlement of population to the peninsula's territory was analyzed in the works of M. Maksymenko, a historian from the Crimea who gave much of his attention to the problem of economic development and demographic processes in the Crimea after the end of World War II¹³. Therefore, prospects for economic revival of the Crimean Peninsula could only be created by its attachment to a service network that had promises of its territorial extension. The service network on the Ukrainian territory was exactly such network. Its expansion prospects broadened as the energy companies Donbasenergo and Dniproenergo were consolidated, and the brown coal deposits in the Dnieper region were developed, thus giving rise to the Southern Energy Area's formation.

Basing on the materials contained in the fund of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, one can identify the number of employable population at collective farms per Ukrainian oblasts who were planned for use in industry. In our case, those are the data as of 1947. The policy of relocating population from the Russian SFSR to the Crimea was implemented in the same period. The degree of efficiency of the rural population involvement as a large-scale construction policy implementation tool is illustrated by the situation concerning the Moscow-Simferopol motorway construction at the section running through Kherson region territory. Collective farm workers from within fifty kilometers along both sides of the roadbed were mobilized for its construction. However, as was discovered in the course of delivering the required materials to the construction site, the territory of Kherson region adjacent to the Crimea also was insufficiently populated, and its agriculture insufficiently mechanized. In harvesting periods, collective farms could not supply labor and transport resources for the motorway construction. Hence, in this instance, there is a striking example that the prescriptive large-scale project implementation plans in the period of the 1946-1950 Five-Year Socioeconomic Development Plan implementation were often prepared without due assessment of situation in the regions of their implementation and needed adjustments.

¹³ М. Максименко, Переселення в Крим сільського населення з інших районів СРСР (1944–1950 рр.), «Український історичний журнал», Київ, 1990, no 11, p. 53.

The drive to use resources of limited territories while implementing the large-scale programs is a clear illustration of the service network establishment principle application in the process of rebuilding the USSR's socioeconomic potential after World War II. In other words, maximum utilization of resource base regionally was meant. The plans provided, actually, for self-sustainability of specific districts in terms of resource provision. In particular, on the UkrSSR territory, local materials were to be used for supplying large-scale construction projects even if implemented with funding from the USSR State Budget. It was also envisaged that products required for the construction be manufactured at enterprises located in Ukraine. Hence, in fact, the service network, logistical or energy system, was to be established regionally, and the mobilization potential of labor and production resources and raw materials located in such region was expected to be the base for its construction. There was a possibility to extract raw materials for the Moscow-Simferopol motorway construction on the Crimean territory, and construction materials for that project could be sourced from the territories of the UkrSSR oblasts adjacent to the Crimean Peninsula's territory. At the same time, industrial facilities located on the Crimean territory and opportunities of industrial construction on the peninsula excluded any possibility to use their products for integrating the peninsula into service networks on the Russian SFSR territory to which the Crimea belonged administratively until 1954. The ruling party, and more specifically, its regional entities and units, performed the main function in terms of regional resource mobilization for service network development. In the Ukrainian territory, the CP(b)U was such unit of the party ruling in the USSR, the VCP(b), in the five-year plan implementation period. Actually, the CP(b)U coordinated the mobilization and involvement of available resources in the Dnieper region and southern UkrSSR areas for constructing the service networks towards which the Crimea tended and in which it was ultimately integrated. Therefore, the mobilization potential of the USSR ruling party's organizations in Ukraine determined the prospects of adopting in 1954 the political decision to transfer the Crimea from the Russian SFSR to the UkrSSR.

The network approach was used in the paper to study the process of the Crimean peninsula's economic integration with the UkrSSR. Indeed, as shown by the experience of rehabilitating the European USSR's economy, destroyed during World War II, the implementation of large-scale projects at the regional level owing to the ruling party network's mobilization potential was the only possible way to revive production and implement infrastructure projects.

Development of lands in the Ukraine's southern areas and the Crimea required considerable capital investments and involvement of labor resources. The UkrSSR government could only attract material capital investments in regions, which were prospective for development, from the Union's budget. Accordingly, for building up the Ukrainian regions, the Union government was to be provided with substantiation of such investments. For that reason, cotton farming was an effective tool to attract them in the UkrSSR and the regions ranking among the most difficult for resource injection. Actually, concerning the construction of the South Ukrainian and North Crimean canals, as the main result received, even though such construction was discontinued in 1952, its manager A. Bochkin named the development of towns and workers' settlements, energy and transport infrastructure, etc. along the future canal route.

Alongside with the problem of supplying water and labor resources to the peninsula, the problem of its provision with energy remained urgent. In particular, total capacity of energy generation facilities was 131,687 thousand kWh, and electrical generation, 441,283 thousand kWh as of 1953¹⁴ The historical data of capacity and electrical generation in the Crimea by years is a situation that is quite interesting for analysis. Specifically, the capacity of generating plants was 28.1 thousand kWh in 1945 and 60.1 thousand kWh in 1949, and generation totaled 175.2 thousand kWh; in 1950, the capacity was already 83.4 thousand kWh, and generation totaled 225 thousand kWh¹⁵. That is, electricity output in the Crimea grew annually; however, disproportion between electricity generation by rural and other plants was noticeable. That was, in the first turn, because urban population prevailed over rural population. Weak Crimean resource base prevented from implementing on the peninsula's territory any large-scale projects that could ensure socioeconomic development.

Implementation of the programs in the Crimean Oblast required that the agencies in charge of them identify substantial capital investments for delivering resources, including labor, to the Crimea. Therefore, actually, those agencies were expected, if the programs were implemented on the Crimean territory, to concentrate considerable investments in the region with doubtful future results. Such projects as the South Ukrainian and North Crimean canal construction can be discussed. That project was procured by a joint resolution

¹⁴ Мощность и выработка электроэнергии в 1953 году электростанций и электрогенераторных установок при промпредприятиях от 200 квт. и выше по Крымской области, включая Севастополь, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 24, спр. 3862, арк. 28.

¹⁵ Мощность энергоустановок и производство электроэнергии в Крыму за ряд лет, ЦДАГО України., ф. 1, оп. 24, спр. 3862, арк. 27.

of the CC VCP(b) and USSR Council of Ministers. However, regardless of such “security”, financial support of that construction became undermined as soon as its implementation began¹⁶. A. Bochkin and M. Shtefan complained about that in their letters. Only fish industry and viticulture developed, and close attention was paid to metallurgy development on the Kerch Peninsula in the Crimea before its inclusion in the UkrSSR. Fish industry, and especially at the Black Sea, was an important economic factor for the USSR. At that sea, sturgeons were fished and caviar was produced and sold for export as a source of foreign exchange earnings for the USSR, and its export grew during the first and second five-year periods after the war¹⁷. The Crimean fish industry also supplied a low-cost fish for the USSR as an optimal resource for solving the food problem. Therefore, the government actively promoted fishery development in the Crimea¹⁸. Viticulture also acquires national significance in the USSR in the postwar period in connection with attempts to pursue a policy of substituting the use of vodka with wine in the society. The way how the wine output increase and viticulture expansion measures were implemented in late 1940s is clearly in evidence; in particular, irrigation of lands areas for gardens, berry fields, and vineyards of 5,489 ha was procured as at 1948¹⁹. Unlike in the UkrSSR, financial incentives for collective farms and collective farm workers dealing with viticulture were guaranteed in the Crimean region²⁰.

Other sectors, which could progress in the Crimea, only had an opportunity to function if assisted by the so-called “interested” agencies, and that could refer to recreation sector and, partially, agriculture. The term “interested” was used in official documents and denoted the agencies that had interest in development of specific facilities, in particular, in the Crimea as well.

The history of the Crimean region budget while a part of the Russian SFSR presents quite an interesting picture. In particular, in 1949, the Crimean region

¹⁶ Замечания к проекту записки по строительству Южно-Украинского канала, разработанной Госпланом СССР. (За підписом – П. С.) Д. Коротченко та Л. Мельникова. Розіслано членам Комісії (Ради Міністрів СРСР – П. С.) за розпорядженням М. Сабурова. 23 лютого 1953, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 24, спр. 2893, арк. 141.

¹⁷ Экспорт СССР по товарам (стоимость в миллионах рублей), Внешняя торговля СССР. Статистический сборник. 1918-1966, Москва 1967, р. 92-93.

¹⁸ Приказ о мероприятиях по обеспечению выполнения плана 1948 года по рыбной промышленности западных районов СССР. – М.: Министерство рыбной промышленности западных районов СССР, 1948, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 5143, арк. 32 зв., 34-34 зв.

¹⁹ Основные показатели выполнения народнохозяйственного плана по Украинской ССР за 1948 год. Орошаемые земли и сельскохозяйственное использование их колхозами, совхозами и подсобными хозяйствами Украинской ССР в 1948 году, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 5885, арк. 145.

²⁰ Товарищу Сталину И. В. (від – П. С.) Н. Хрущева, Л. Кагановича. 30 августа 1947 г., ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 24, спр. 4026, арк. 371-372.

budget was set at 356,243 thousand rubles²¹. Meanwhile, the Russian SFSR state budget totaled 51,803,731 thousand rubles, and the republican budget was 40,849,039 thousand rubles²². At the same time, the sum of state taxes and revenues transferred from the Russian SFSR republican budget to the budgets of territories, republics, region`s, and cities of republican subordination totaled 28,760,851 thousand rubles. Hence, the Crimean region budget in 1949 accounted for a little more than 1.2 percent of the amount transferred from the Russian SFSR republican budget to the budgets of regions, territories, etc. and not so many as 0.9 percent of the Russian SFSR republican budget. The Crimean region budget indicators as of 1953, the last budget year when the Crimea was a part of the Russian SFSR, should be used for comparison. For that year, the Crimean region budget was approved at 410,327 thousand rubles²³, while the Russian SFSR republican budget totaled 39,685,712 thousand rubles²⁴. In other words, Crimean region accounted for a little more than one percent of the total republican budget. The budget indicators in the Crimean region's first year as a part of the UkrSSR should be taken as a comparison. Specifically, this region's budget totaled 434,823 thousand rubles²⁵ in terms of both revenues and expenditures, while the UkrSSR's state budget in terms of expenditures amounted to 22,988,180 thousand rubles²⁶ and the UkrSSR's republican budget was 18,704,220 thousand rubles. That is, in 1954, the Crimean region's budget increased by 24,496 thousand rubles, or by a little more than 5.6 percent. At the same time, during 1949-1953, the Crimean region's budget increased by 54,084 thousand rubles, or by a little more than 13 percent in those four years. Hence, the growth rate of the Crimean region's budget once included in the UkrSSR slightly grew. It should be noted, however, that the budget of Crimean region once in the UkrSSR was almost 2.3 percent of the republican budget. Therefore, an overall positive and quite noticeable change in the Crimean region budgeting should be pointed out. For a more substantive analysis, some of the

²¹ Закон о государственном бюджете Российской Советской Федеративной Социалистической Республики на 1949 год, Заседание Верховного Совета РСФСР 2-го созыва, третья сессия (24-27 мая 1949 г.). Стенографический отчет, Москва 1949, p. 232.

²² Ibidem, p. 231.

²³ Закон о государственном бюджете Российской Советской Федеративной Социалистической Республики на 1953 год, Заседание Верховного Совета РСФСР 3-го созыва, третья сессия (25-27 августа 1953 г.). Стенографический отчет, Москва 1953, p. 181.

²⁴ Ibidem, p. 180.

²⁵ Закон про Державний бюджет Української Радянської Соціалістичної Республіки на 1954 рік, Засідання Верховної Ради Української РСР (шоста сесія) 16-17 червня 1954 р. Стенографічний звіт, Київ 1954, p. 118.

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 117.

Crimean region's expenditure indicators in 1953 and 1954 should be used. This will enable to trace how material the changes in the peninsula's socioeconomic development budgeting were. In 1953, planned for the Crimea (inclusive of Sevastopol) were capital investments of 898,346 thousand rubles, and of those, 681,892 thousand rubles were utilized at the year-end²⁷. That is, planned capital investments were well above the Crimean region's budget, and utilized capital investments were also well in excess of provided budget funding. If one traces the properties, in which the capital investments were made, those subordinated to all-union agencies will prevail. Those include Komysh-Burun Iron Ore Works (76,700 thousand rubles planned and 40,000 thousand rubles utilized), Voikov Plant (87,130 thousand rubles planned and 52,018 thousand rubles utilized), Kirov Coking Plant (28,300 thousand rubles planned and 8,710 thousand rubles utilized), Krymnaftogazrozvidka Group (41,850 thousand rubles planned and 37,772 thousand rubles utilized), Masandra Winery (16,107 thousand rubles planned and 14,779 thousand rubles utilized), Sanatoria and Health Resorts Department of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions (10,677 thousand rubles planned and 10,690 thousand rubles utilized), Ukrvodbud's Building and Construction Department No. 10 (20,000 thousand rubles planned and 11,917 thousand rubles utilized), Department of State Farms (11,527 thousand rubles planned and 9,501 thousand rubles utilized), Region Department of Agriculture and Machine and Tractor Stations (5,151 thousand rubles planned and 2,460 thousand rubles utilized), Region Department of Energy (14,700 thousand rubles planned and 14,209 thousand rubles utilized), Krymvodgosp (10,240 thousand rubles planned and 11,515 thousand rubles utilized), Oblkomkhos (municipal construction) (10,181 thousand rubles planned and 9,782 thousand rubles utilized)²⁸. The presented capital investment information enables to gain an understanding of the USSR government's priority as to sectors to be developed in Crimean region. Actually, capital investments were intended for development of the appropriate sectors. Noteworthy in the first turn are the capital investment objects with respect to which the target was surpassed, and those included the Sanatoria and Health Resorts Department of the ACCTU (100.1 percent and 493 thousand rubles utilized above the target), Krymvodgosp (112.5 percent), and with respect to

²⁷ Сводка о выполнении плана капитальных вложений организациями Крымской области за январь-декабрь 1953 года (данные текущей отчетности, по сметной стоимости в тыс. рублей), ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 24, спр. 3862, арк. 36.

²⁸ Сводка о выполнении плана капитальных вложений организациями Крымской области за январь-декабрь 1953 года (данные текущей отчетности по стоимости текущей отчетности, по сметной стоимости в тыс. руб.), ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 24, спр. 3862, арк. 37.

Oblkomkhos (municipal construction), performance outstripped the target, however, in accordance with the plan, 91.6 percent of capital investments and 1,315 thousand rubles were utilized in excess of the plan, that is, in the aggregate, utilization above the target also refers to the Department of State Farms, 82.4 percent of the capital investment plan; however, 2,091 thousand rubles were utilized outside the plan, and the final capital investment amount proved to exceed the planned sum. Krymnaftogazrozvidka (90.3 per cent), Masandra Winery (91.8 per cent), and Region Department of Energy (96.7 percent) were close in terms of capital investment utilization indicators. Hence, such sectors as recreation, water management, energy development, oil and gas exploration, and viticulture were of highest priority in Crimean region prior to its transfer to the UkrSSR. Development of water sector and energy were the areas to be developed for maintaining a steady social situation. The matter of active oil and gas resource development in Ukrainian southern areas became especially urgent back in 1948 in UkrSSR as well²⁹. Moreover, oil and gas resource development in the Azov-Black Sea region was placed among the conditions of rural electrification development in the Master Plan with respect to the UkrSSR. Ukraine had a considerable experience of oil and gas resource development in its western region by then, and exploration activities were extended to Azov and Black Sea coastal areas in the end of the first five years after the war. The group Krymnaftogazrozvidka was transferred to Ukrnafta Group³⁰ in 1954. It should also be noted that hydrocarbon exploration activities stepped up in the Crimea in 1949, and hence, there is a good reason to see the logical binding of the intensified exploration activities in the Crimea and Ukraine's southern region that took a systemic institutional form as the peninsula was transferred to the UkrSSR in 1954.

²⁹ Совет Министров Союза ССР тов. Берия Л. П. (від– П. С.) Хрущева Н. С. 9 декабря 1948 г., ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 5603, арк. 246.

³⁰ (В – П. С.) Совет Министров УССР товарищу Кальченко Н. Т., ЦК КП Украины товарищу Подгорному Н. В. (від – П. С.) Ю. Дудин. Сообщаю о ходе рассмотрения вопросов в Совете Министров СССР, министерствах и центральных ведомствах СССР по письмам Совета Министров УССР и ЦК КП Украины. Принято по ВЧ 21.VIII.54 г., ЦДАГО України., ф. 1, оп. 24, спр. 3725, арк. 120.

3. The main directions of implementation of projects for the development of economy of the south-eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR

Quick reconstruction of economy means to engage the majority of the local resources. Prioritizing the development of some regions was crucial to succeed, relevant industrial hubs to be developed in proper places. Donbas was first to stimulate the socio-economic development through the engagement of the own powerful coal-mining facilities. It was to cover the fuel needs of the whole Ukrainian SSR economy. In 1947 Nikita Khrushchev reported on behalf of the Ukrainian SSR Ministers' Council Head that rehabilitation of Donbas industrial potential was the key to prosperity of the whole Ukrainian economy. That's why the majority of working population was to mine coal in Donbas region after the Second World War. And the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League of Soviet Union, in particular, was to fulfill either organizational or propagandist origin. They did gather and depart a train full of volunteers ready to mine the Donbas region. And train was of two directions: to Stalino (Donetsk since 1960) and to Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk since 1958). 1000 young members of the Communist Party were attracted from 19 different regions of Ukraine to send a train on a highway³¹. At that time, Donbas was the region of employees from different Ukrainian SSR regions indoctrination, because people from various parts of Ukraine were coming there. That's why Komsomol paid attention special clubs and «red corners» (ideological propagandist stands) to operate exactly in Donbas region³².

Government was paying attention to Donbas and North-Donetsk railway, in particular to renovate the railway transport. It was the critical for Donetsk coal basin hub³³. It was designed coal, raw materials as well as ready made production to export and supply the region. And reconstruction of the Ukrainian SSR southern industrial areas, such as Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odessa regions

³¹ Секретарю ЦК КП(б)У товарищу Коротченко Д. С. (від – П. С.) Секретаря ЦК ЛКСМУ М. Митрохина и Г. Шевель. 14.X.47 г., ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4566, арк. 130.

³² Мероприяття по выполнению постановления ЦК КП(б)У «Об улучшении идейно-политической и организационной работы в комсомольских организациях Украины». За підписом В. Семичастного. 13.X.47 г., ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4566, арк. 178.

³³ Секретарю Центрального Комитета Коммунистической партии (большевиков) Украины товарищу Л. М. Кагановичу Доклад о ходе выполнения годового плана капитальных работ по восстановлению железных дорог Украины 1-м Корпусом железнодорожных войск к 30-й годовщине Великой Октябрьской Социалистической Революции (від – П. С.) командира Корпуса генерал-лейтенанта технических войск Картенева, начальника политотдела гвардии полковника Пастухова. 1 ноября 1947, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4747, арк. 2.

ought to be performed on the Donbas coal energy. These towns in southern Ukraine were named industrial hubs, because independent power generation enterprises and power plants were supporters of that political ideology. In 1947 these energy companies could provide only Kherson with energy. 9300 kW was the planned consumption capacity, and the planned power generation capacity was to reach 9750 kW³⁴, exceeding the predictable consumption. The lack of power generating capacity was obvious in Mykolaiv and Odessa³⁵. And at the same time Kherson region and the city itself were planned to be a priority for government in the nearest future. Kherson hydroelectric power station was enlisted for construction on the Dnieper after 1947. Nikita Khrushchev as a Ukrainian SSR Head of Ministers's Council mentioned this fact in own report to the USSR Head of Ministers's Council Josef Stalin, which was transmitted with the help of special high-frequency communication line³⁶ (governmental communication secure line). There was no precise construction plan as well as location for the future hydroelectric power station in 1947. Project and construction plan were agreed only in 1950 with the approval of resolution «About the construction of Khakovka Hydroelectric Power Station, Southern-Ukrainian and Southern-Crimean channels as well as irrigation system for the southern parts of Ukraine and northern parts of Crimea» by the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party and Ministers' Council of USSR. Nova Khakovka as a twin-city was planned to be constructed together with hydroelectric power station. In 1947 Nikita Khrushchev reported that this project was to enhance energy generating capacities of the Dniproenergo (DNEN) and Donbasenergo (DOEN) as a result of high-voltage transmission line construction Kriviy Rig-Mykolaiv-Kherson-Odessa³⁷.

Energy generating enterprises were to develop industrial hubs as well, and that's why Dniproenergo was created. This power generating system of the local significance was to occupy the River Dnieper region. Up to the 1st of May in 1947 reconstruction of this regional power generating system reached less than a quarter of its pre-war level³⁸. At the same time speed at which Donbasenergo was restoring its capacities was much higher than one of Dniproenergo. On

³⁴ Секретарю ЦК КП(б)У Л. Кагановичу «Об энергоснабжении народного хозяйства Украинской ССР в 1947 году» (від – П. С.) Д. Коротченка, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4023, арк. 446.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, Арк. 442.

³⁶ Товарищу Сталину И. В. (від – П. С.) Н. Хрущева. 31.XII.47 г. Передано по ВЧ, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4697, арк. 565.

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁸ Секретарю ЦК КП(б)У Л. Кагановичу «Об энергоснабжении народного хозяйства Украинской ССР в 1947 году» (від – П. С.) Д. Коротченка, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4023, арк. 438.

the 1st of May in 1947 Dniproenergo energy capacity was restored up to 82,3% of its pre-war level³⁹. But the USSR government paid significant attention to the rehabilitation of Dniproenergo capacities as well. Dniproenergo with own capacities was to provide socio-economic development of the Ukrainian SSR area. Area on the both sides of the River Dnieper, including the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya industries, meant to be the parts of this power generating system. Its reconstruction was crucial to provide Dniproenergo with power generating capacity. Despite that Dniproenergo region was in need of immediate supply with energy resources, this power generating system was connected to Donbasenergo in order to provide system with continuous amount of voltage power.

Agricultural development was important at times of Ukrainian economy reconstruction on the basis of industrial hubs. It was driven by political motives, but not only. Countries belonging to the sphere of the USSR's influence were provided with foodstuffs stores to supply them with necessary provision⁴⁰. Since 1947 a lot of attention was dedicated to this. And since 1946 a lot of effort and emphasize was put to provide agriculture with electricity in terms of this program of promising industrial hubs. This program was focused on southern parts of Ukraine. When independent firm «Silelektro» was created in Kherson in 1947, it was responsible for program execution across the whole region. Earlier Zaporizhzhya interregional firm «Silelektro» was supplying the whole agriculture of Kherson region with electricity. The question of energy supply for the southern parts of Ukrainian SSR, and Kherson region adjacent to Crimea in particular, was tightly interconnected with implementation of arid regions irrigation program on the territory of Ukrainian SSR. It also meant the area of Kherson and Mykolaiv regions provided with the unequal amount of cereal per year.

You could harvest around 12,2 quintals (1quintal=100kg) of cereal per hectare across the Kherson region on average in 1944 - these amounts were at the level of best harvesting times before the Second World War, but already in 1945 the average crop production was kept around 6,5 quintals pro hectare⁴¹. The last indicator was worse than the worst indicators before the war. Nikita Khrushchev reported about this problem to Josef Stalin. It was the concern of

³⁹ Ibidem, Арк. 439.

⁴⁰ Перечень принятых постановлений Пленумом, Политбюро, Оргбюро и Секретариата ЦК КП(б)У за период с 10.III. по 9.IV.1947 г. и сроки их исполнения, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4012, арк. 159.

⁴¹ (В – П. С.) Совет Министров Украинской ССР (від – П. С.) и. о. Начальника Статистического управления Украинской ССР Вихерпу. 18.IX.1947. Херсонська область. Урожайность в колхозах, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 5015, арк. 50.

energy base supply disconnection with development of these areas as well as their irrigation⁴².

These regions had the similar to northern parts of Crimea landscape. And it played its role at times of Southern-Ukrainian and Southern-Crimean channels construction as well as when Crimean peninsula was being transferred to the Ukrainian SSR⁴³. The large scale construction of channels and irrigation systems started in 1950. It aimed to provide irrigation for 1500 thousand hectares of land⁴⁴ and 300 000 hectares of them were located in southern parts of Crimea⁴⁵. Government was already aware of irrigation system development prospects in southern parts of Ukraine as well as northern parts of Crimea in 1947, when studies over the question begun. Lazar Kaganovich, as a First Secretary of the Soviet Union Communist Party Central Committee, and Nikita Khrushchev made a report to Josef Stalin about it⁴⁶. Moreover, the irrigation system of these regions was to function using the Dnieper water resources. And a special institution in the Minister's Council of Ukrainian SSR appeared to study the construction prospectives of such irrigation system. And «Silelectro» representative became the member of it as well⁴⁷. Prospectives of agricultural electrification and irrigation formed a special complex of arrangements for agricultural development and creation of provision base to enhance industrial development in the region. These arrangements contrasted with the social situation of Crimean region, where lots of citizens were concentrated in lots of cities in comparison to the southern parts of the Ukrainian SSR. Moreover, there was no secure provision base as well as lack of available labor to develop the Crimean agriculture.

⁴² Товарищу Сталину И. В. (від – П. С.) Н. Хрущева. 31.XII.47 г. Передано по ВЧ, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4697, арк. 565.

⁴³ Заседание Верховного Совета СССР 4-го созыва, первая сессия (20-27 апреля 1954 г.): стенографический отчет, Москва 1954, р. 474.

⁴⁴ Стенограммы докладов начальника «Укрводстроя» тов Бочкина А. Е. и начальника «Днепростроя» тов. Андрианова С. Н. о строительстве Каховской гидроэлектростанции, Южно-Украинского и Северо-Крымского каналов, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 24, спр. 236, арк. 37.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, Арк. 38.

⁴⁶ Товарищу Сталину И. В. (від – П. С.) Секретаря ЦК КП(б)У Л. М. Кагановича. 2 августа 1947 г., ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4026, арк. 271.

⁴⁷ Структура Главного Управления сельской электрификации при Совете Министров УССР, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 23, спр. 4023, арк. 106.

4. Transformation of economic and logistical importance of the city of Kherson

Since 1947 the Kherson city status was prioritized to become a promising transport hub, connecting Crimea with the continent. Djankoy-Kherson route construction with the total length of 177 km was be the part of Stalin railway development plan. This route was to connect Kherson and Crimea and transport cargo to Djankoy as well as the same amount to Kherson with a total amount of 0,6 million tonnes per kilometer in both directions. And this amount was planned to grow up to 1,2 million tonnes per kilometer in 1960 on Djankoy-Kherson route and remain 0,6 million tonnes per kilometer on Kherson-Djankoy route.⁴⁸ This new railway line was to connect Crimea and continental Ukraine as well as increase the total number of possible transfers to and from the peninsula keeping the same amount of the passengers maintained on this route. Such prospective plans about the total number of transfers increase as well as increase in passengers and cargoes transportation standards (from its territory to the continental part of Ukrainian SSR) would define the rapid economic development of peninsula. At the same time it was another perspective Djankoy-Fedorivka (communication station in Zaporizhzhya) railway route connecting Crimean peninsula and continental part of Ukraine. This route had already been operating in 1940. And the amount of transferred cargoes was the following: about 2,7 million tones per kilometer from Djankoy in direction to Fedorivka and 3,0 million tones of cargo per kilometer from Fedorivka to Djankoy. The transportation plan in 1950 had to be the next: 2,4 million tones per kilometer from Djankoy to Fedorivka and 2,6 million tones per kilometer from Fedorivka to Djankoy. In 1960 figures had to be the following: 3,9 million tones of cargo per kilometer from Djankoy to Fedorivka and 4,9 tones of cargo per kilometer from Fedorivka to Djankoy⁴⁹.

Before the Second World War industrialized East of Ukraine was full of cities with a rise of industrial hubs around them. We speak about Donbas region as well as such cities as Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya. Zaporizhzhya was a competitive industrial region with lots of power generating enterprises there as well. Actually, the development of southern Ukrainian SSR regions was tightly tightly dependent on Zaporizhzhya region industrialization as well.

⁴⁸ Выписка их проекта развития сети железных дорог Союза ССР на генеральную перспективу. Грузовые потоки по основным направлениям ж. д. сети УССР на перспективу. 10.X.1947, ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 24, спр. 4753, арк. 353.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, Арк. 351.

So, agricultural electrification at times of war meant the complex construction arrangements of small power generating stations (mainly, hydro and wind). Besides, it was meant high-voltage power lines for collective and state farms. Step by step in 1947 building high-voltage power line connections becomes more prioritized than construction of small power stations. This happened across the Kherson region, where high voltage power station connections prevailed over the other types of connection. Actually, energetic development programs were realized in terms of large power generating enterprises as well as high-voltage power lines construction. It resulted in industrial manufacturing concentration and rapid development of agriculture. It started in 1947 as collective farms began to grow. Post-war Kherson was the city of a small concentration of industrial manufacturing, in comparison to Zaporizhzhya. Agricultural development of the southern parts of the Ukrainian SSR and particularly Kherson region included the appearing of new industrial hub. It was because farming conditions were similar to the southern Crimean ones. It meant to be a good place to establish a promising industrial hub for Crimean socio-economic development, because this region hadn't been industrially loaded yet. The prospective development of Kherson city and region railway transport are described in plan. You can also notice Stalin railway exploitation plan there with such especially emphasized route as Crimea-Kherson one.

5. To sum up

Thus, after the end of the World War Second, the economic life on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula and southern regions of Ukraine was destroyed. In the Crimea, the renewal of economy was hampered by unfavourable climatic conditions for development of agriculture and problems with supply of fresh water both for the agriculture and for the industry. The territory of southern regions of Ukraine also needed water resources for agricultural development, which had to create conditions for involving manpower resources to these regions and for creation of agricultural basis for the cities. The social and economic development of Crimea and southern regions of Ukraine acquired for the USSR a significant political importance from 1947 due to sharpening of the confrontation with Western countries and the orientation of Turkish foreign policy towards allied approachment to the USA. After the end of the World War Second, during the first five years of the USSR five-year plan, the government of the Ukrainian SSR gives the main attention to development of

electric power generation in southeast regions of Ukraine creating powerful energy areas based on coal from Donets Basin. These energy areas are formed due to extensive building of power transmission lines supplying power to such cities of the Ukrainian south as Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odesa. Development of power generation created conditions for implementation of the agriculture electrification program, which was realized both through building small power plants and through connecting farms to high-voltage power transmission lines. Notwithstanding the slow implementation of this program in south regions of Ukrainian SSR, its realization promoted searching for new approaches to development of the economy in the region. In realization of programs for economic development in south regions of Ukrainian SSR, with account taken of severe climatic conditions for agriculture, projects of building watering and irrigation systems were very important. Such programs were actively developed and partly implemented. However, the implementation of electrification plans developed a systemic approach to realization of the project of watering and irrigation in south regions of Ukraine and on the Crimean Peninsula. At the same time, during the implementation of programs for industrial and agricultural development in south regions of Ukraine, long-range plans were developed as for transportation by Stalin Railways covering the territory of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions of Ukraine and the Crimea. Actually, the realization of programs for development of southeast regions of Ukraine created conditions for transferring their experience and for their further continuation on the territory of Crimea. In this context, Kherson city transformed its social and economic importance to become a big logistics center that had to enable the connection of Crimea with the continent. Thus, the implementation of programs for development of economy in south regions of Ukraine resulted in creation of the basis for the social and economic growth of the Crimean Peninsula.

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