The term “war of remembrance” used is the Russian equivalent of Western terms for “historical politics”. Its origins can be traced back to the last years of the Soviet Union, when interest in “true” history could no longer be administratively curbed or directed. The period of Boris Yeltsin's presidency saw an increase in publications based on declassified sources and free of ideological argumentation. The “new” Russia saw the emergence of historians who were not afraid to tackle difficult, often painful topics, including the rule of Vladimir Lenin and, above all, Joseph Stalin. However, this trend was halted after Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999-2000. Since then, the peculiarities of Russian historical policy have begun to result from two basic conditions. Firstly, these are systemic factors, the result of specific socio-cultural conditions shaped by the turbulent history of the 20th century. Secondly, it is determined by the current interests of the authoritarian regime, which leads to extreme politicisation of the subject of the past and the elimination of pluralism of opinion in public debate. The historical narrative constructed in this way is concerned with legitimising the authoritarian system of government as optimal for Russia and perpetuating a model of state-society relations that is convenient for the Kremlin. Russian historical policy also serves to legitimise the image of the state, its international role and its power interests, including its aggressive foreign policy. Its main purpose is to legitimise Russian claims of a particular influence on the geopolitical shape of contemporary Europe and on the architecture of European security. The authorities refer to the Soviet matrix of perceived history, characterised by a pronounced anti-Western trait. This is due to the fundamental importance of the USSR era as the apogee of Russia's international power, to serve the contemporary vision of the international order favoured by the Kremlin.